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in Lanham Act cases, a claimant claiming false advertising of product superiority must affirmatively prove that the
product is equal or inferior in order to
prevail.
The court acknowledged that Castrol
was required to affirmatively prove
that Pennzoil's product was equal or
inferior, but held that Castrol had sustained this burden of proof. The court
noted that Castrol had tested both its
products and Pennzoil' s under the Stayin-Grade and HTHS standards. Both
Pennzoil and Castrol met the Stay-inGrade requirements. However, while
all Castrol motor oils and most Pennzoil
motor oils met the HTHS standards,
Pennzoil's 5W-30 and 1OW-30 oils
failed to pass this test. Therefore, the
court held that Castrol had adequately
proven that Pennzoil's products were
equal, or in some cases inferior, to
Castrol's motor oils.
Moreover, the court found that
Castrol had properly discredited the
evidence with which Pennzoil sought
to substantiate its viscosity breakdown
claim. Pennzoil based its claim on the
fact that its motor oils had suffered less
viscosity loss percentage than Castrol
oils in the ASTM D-3945 test. However, Castrol proved that the ASTM D3945 test was never intended to compare the viscosity breakdown of oils of
different polymer classes, and could
not perform this function accurately.
Since Pennzoil and Castrol are oils of
different polymer classes, the court
held that Pennzoil's advertising claims
were literally false.
Pennzoil'sClaim to Better Engine
ProtectionFalse by Implication
Pennzoil next contended that the
district court erred in deciding that its
claims of superior engine protection
were false by necessary implication.
The appellate court, however, disagreed
with this contention. The court noted
that Pennzoil's advertisements claimed,
although falsely, that Pennzoil outperforms any leading motor oil against
viscosity breakdown. Pennzoil also
claimed that viscosity breakdown led
Volume 5 Number 4 / Summer 1993

to engine failure and that Pennzoil
provided better protection against engine failure. This left consumers with
the necessary implication that Pennzoil
protected better against engine failure
because it outperformed any leading
motor oil against viscosity breakdown.
Having found the viscosity breakdown
claim to be literally false, the court
ruled that the engine failure claim must
also be false by necessary implication.
False Speech Not ProtectedBy The
FirstAmendment
Pennzoil argued that the district
court's injunction violated Pennzoil's
right to free speech under the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Pennzoil contended that the
order would prohibit Pennzoil from
claiming that its motor oils provided
superior protection against viscosity
breakdown at any time in the future.
Thus, even if Pennzoil improved its
product so that the prohibited statement became true, it would still be
barred from stating this truth. Therefore, Pennzoil argued that the injunction was an unconstitutional restraint
on its free speech.
The court rejected this argument,
holding that the First Amendment does
not protect false commercial speech.
The court stated that Pennzoil's claim
that its motor oils provided better protection against viscosity breakdown was
false at the present time and therefore
was not protected by the First Amendment. The court suggested that Pennzoil
could apply for a modification of the
injunction if its viscosity breakdown
claim became true at some later date.
Dissent Urges that Consumer Survey
Evidence Crucial
The dissent argued that both the
majority and the district court improperly ignored the consumer survey evidence presented by Pennzoil. It noted
that Pennzoil had introduced a consumer survey which purported to demonstrate that consumers largely ignored
Pennzoil's claims of superior engine
protection and greater protection against

viscosity breakdown. The dissent urged
that because the Lanham Act was intended to provide a private remedy to a
commercial plaintiff whose commercial interests have been harmed by a
competitor's false advertising, the critical question was not the content of the
advertisement, but the message it conveyed to consumers. **.
-

Colby M. Green

Students Enrolled in NonAccredited Course Not
Aggrieved Consumers
In Finstad v. Washburn Univ. of
Topeka, 845 P.2d 685 (Kan. 1993),
the Kansas Supreme Court held that
students who were not aggrieved consumers as defined by the Kansas Consumer Protection Act could not sue to
recover damages from enrolling in nonaccredited courses. Additionally, the
court found that no legally recognizable claim for education malpractice
exists.
False Statement of Accreditation
Washburn University of Topeka
("Washburn") began offering a court
reporting program in 1984. In 1985,
the University hired Debra Smith
("Smith"), a Certified Shorthand Reporter and a Registered Professional
Reporter, as the instructor for this new
program. Until 1989, Smith's students
judged her satisfactorily in instructor
evaluations. However, in the fall of
1989, students began complaining about
poor instruction in the court reporting
program. As a result, Washburn undertook remedial measures against
Smith, who subsequently resigned in
the spring of 1990.
At the commencement of the court
reporting program in 1984, Washburn
sought course accreditation from the
National Shorthand Reporters Asso-
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ciation. The Association, however, did
not approve the course until the summer of 1990. Although the 1985-1987
academic catalogue correctly stated that
the "University will apply for full accreditation with the NSRA, which is
expected in 1986," the next catalogue,
issued for 1987-1989, contained a false
statement of accreditation.
The catalogue also included a section on the University's School of
Applied and Continuing Education,
which offered the court reporting program. Although this section listed the
accrediting agencies that had approved
other programs within this school, it
did not contain any accreditation statement relating to the court reporting
program.
Within one week after Washburn
noticed the false claim of accreditation,
it began placing white tape over the
statement in all undistributed catalogues. In addition, the Washburn
administration conducted announcements to classes regarding the error and
stating that the University was presently seeking accreditation. All other
brochures available to students correctly stated that Washburn sought accreditation for the course.
Several court reporting students filed
a lawsuit against Washburn alleging
that the false statement of accreditation
in the catalogue was a violation of the
Kansas Consumer Protection Act

("Act"),

KAN. STAT. ANN.

50-623 to

50-644 (1973).
The students also
claimed the University committed
"educational malpractice" in its conduct and supervision of the court reporting program.
The trial court granted judgment for
Washburn, noting that it was necessary
for the students to show that Washburn's
violation of the Act had caused them
some injury. The students appealed
this decision to the Kansas Supreme
Court.

Siudents' Claims
The students, who did not claim that
they relied on the false statement of
128

accreditation when they enrolled at
Washburn, argued that the Act did not
require proof of reliance on the false
statement. The students contended that
the Act merely required them to show
that they were consumers engaged in a
consumer transaction with Washburn
and further, that Washburn committed
an act defined as "deceptive" under the
Act. Moreover, since the Kansas Attorney General was allowed to bring a
suit under the Act without bringing it
on behalf of an "aggrieved consumer,"
the students asserted that they too should
be allowed to sue, even if they were not
aggrieved.

Causal Connection Required Under
the Act
The Supreme Court of Kansas upheld the trial court's grant of judgment
in favor of Washburn. Although the
false statement of accreditation was a
per se violation of the Act under this
amendment, the court indicated that
this actual violation was not sufficient
to allow the students to recover. Accordingly, the court held that a consumer could not recover under the Act
without a showing that the consumer
was aggrieved by the violation.
In its decision, the court relied upon
the definition of "aggrieved" included
in an earlier Kansas Supreme Court
case, FairfaxDrainageDist. v. City of
Kansas City, 374 P.2d 35 (Kan. 1962).
In Fairfax,the court said an aggrieved
party was someone who had a substantial grievance, who had been denied a
personal or property right, or upon
whom a burden or obligation had been
imposed. The court found that the
students had not met this standard because they had not relied on the false
statement of accreditation. In fact,
many were unaware of the statement.
The court also noted that the students
had not suffered any loss or injury
because of the false statement. Accordingly, although the students were consumers under the Act, they were not
aggrieved by Washburn's violation of
that act.

Educational Malpractice Not a
Recognized Claim
The Kansas Supreme Court also
upheld the trial court'sjudgment on the
claim of educational malpractice, noting that no American court has recognized this as a legal claim. The students
based their argument on the low pass
rates of Washburn students taking the
statewide certification examination.
While the court acknowledged these
statistics, it noted that there was no
proof that the instruction in the court
reporting course caused the low pass
rates.
According to the court, several public policy concerns weighed against
recognizing a new cause of action for
educational malpractice. The court
identified the lack of a measurable
standard of care and the potential for a
flood of lawsuits as compelling policy
reasons against recognizing a tort claim
for educational malpractice. In addition, the court was reluctant to involve
the state's courts in monitoring the
daily operations of schools. Finally,
the court noted that the difficulties in
establishing a causal connection between the educational process and an
individual student's success also
weighed against recognizing this new
type of tort claim. o**
- JoAnne Juliano Giger

Fair Debt Collection
PracticesAct and
Consumer Protection Act
Inapplicable to Consumer
Cash on Delivery
Transactions
In Sterling Mirror of Maryland,
Inc. v. Gordon, 619 A.2d 64, (D.C.
App. 1993), the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals held that neither the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act nor
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